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The current crisis calls for a re-assessment of the optimal conduct of macroeconomic 
policies during non-crisis normal times. In particular, the risk and costs of crises can be 
mitigated by macroeconomic policies that lean against the wind in the face of cyclical, 
sectoral and external shocks. In this paper, I discuss the challenges involved in deploying 
fiscal policy in pursuit of a broad definition of macroeconomic stabilisation. The main policy 
conclusion is that pro-stabilisation fiscal policies are likely to be more effective if fiscal policy 
is determined under a formal fiscal framework that combines a set of fiscal rules and a 
substantive role for an independent fiscal policy council. 
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The global economic and financial crisis that has gripped the world since Summer 2007 has 
naturally generated much questioning about the conduct of economic policies during the 
pre-crisis period (and, indeed, the quality of the economic research that is supposed to 
provide a basis for policymaking). The response to the crisis has involved aggressive 
orthodox and non-orthodox monetary policies, plus fiscal stimulus packages in many 
countries. With the passing of the most acute phases of the crisis, attention is now turning to 
optimal exit strategies for both monetary and fiscal policies, while it is also timely to re-assess 
the appropriate macroeconomic policies for the resumption of normal times. 
In this paper, my focus is on the latter question.  In particular, I address the implications of 
the crisis for the optimal design of fiscal policy. One obvious motivation is that better-run 
macroeconomic policies during the pre-crisis period may have reduced the likelihood of such 
a crisis occurring and the possible scale of the crisis. In addition, not all countries were able 
to pro-actively use fiscal policy to offset the negative demand shock from the global 
recession. Following the typology of Spilimbergo et al (2008), these countries lacked the 
fiscal space to respond to the crisis -  the lesson to be drawn is that fiscal policy during 
normal times must be sufficiently sustainable and counter-cyclical to enable aggressive fiscal 
intervention in the event of a major negative shock. 
 
Although the optimal conduct of monetary policy also requires serious revision, it is 
important to devote serious research attention to fiscal policy.  The heated debate during the crisis across the different schools of macroeconomics about the conceptual foundations and 
empirical magnitudes of fiscal multipliers underlines the limited knowledge and 
understanding in the economics profession in relation to the potential effectiveness of fiscal 
policy. Moreover, fiscal policy is especially important in environments in which monetary or 
exchange rate policies cannot be effectively deployed.  This applies to members of a 
monetary union or a pegged exchange rate system in relation to macroeconomic stabilisation 
at a country level. It also applies more generally in situations in which orthodox monetary 
policy is redundant, as when interest rate policy hits the zero bound. 
 
It is not possible to cover all dimensions of the fiscal policy research agenda in this paper. 
Instead, I highlight a small number of key issues. First, I discuss the implications of the crisis 
for the optimal cyclical conduct of fiscal policy.  Second, I argue that the scope of the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy ought to be expanded beyond the output cycle, in order 
to respond to the emergence of excessive sectoral or external imbalances. Third, I propose 
that the current crisis has re-inforced the case for reform of the institutional frameworks 
which guide the formation of fiscal policy. These issues are addressed in turn in Sections 2, 3 




In order to contribute to macroeconomic stability, it is desirable that fiscal policy moves in a 
counter-cyclical pattern. The ideal pattern is that fiscal surpluses are accumulated during 
boom periods which in turn enables the running of fiscal deficits during downturns without 
threatening long-term fiscal sustainability.    
Such principles are easy to state. However, their application is not so straightforward. First, 
while the traditional focus has been on GDP cycles, fluctuations in asset markets and the 
sectoral composition of output are also relevant in determining the optimal stance for fiscal 
policy. One basic reason is that tax revenues are sensitive to the distribution of output across 
different sectors. For instance, it is well understood that the United Kingdom was heavily 
reliant on the high profitability and high labour incomes in the financial services industry as a 
source of tax revenue.  In the Irish case, tax revenues during the 2002-2007 boom period 
were highly reliant on transactions-based taxes in the property sector and on capital gains 
taxes that were high during a period of rapid asset price appreciation. 
 
More generally, high asset prices can amplify tax revenues through several channels. At a 
direct level, capital gains and wealth taxes increase when asset prices improve.  Indirectly, 
high asset prices boost consumption and investment through positive wealth and balance 
sheet effects. Furthermore, the level of turnover in asset markets is typically increasing in the 
level of asset prices, such that the revenues from transactions taxes also grow. 
 
 The importance of asset prices and wealth shocks for tax revenues has been documented 
for a panel of countries by Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2004).  In the Irish case, Addison-
Smyth and McQuinn (2009) calculate a substantial tax windfall from the 2002-2007 housing 
boom in Ireland that was fuelled by capital inflows.  More generally, Morris et al (2009) show 
that revenue windfalls are more likely when output is growing strongly, such that revenue 
surprises tend to amplify the normal cyclical variation in revenues. 
 Accordingly, the optimal fiscal balance is not just a function of the output gap but also needs 
to take into account the temporary nature of the extra tax revenues that may be generated by 
unbalanced growth episodes in which asset prices are growing quickly and/or high-income 
sectors grow disproportionately quickly. Under such conditions, a larger fiscal surplus is 
appropriate in view of temporary nature of the windfall revenues and risk of sudden stops in 
activity level in such sectors. 
 
Second, decisions about the appropriate stance for fiscal policy must be taken in a fog of 
uncertainty.  Along one dimension, it is non-trivial to decompose output between  cyclical 
and trend components. Along another dimension, it is vital to consider the distribution of 
risks around the central forecast, rather than focusing exclusively on the expected path for 
output.   
 
In relation to the first point, the identification of the trend output path for a small and highly 
open economy is bound to carry a large standard error band. International mobility of capital 
and labour means that the potential level of production can shift quite rapidly.  In particular, 
international factor mobility means that persistent positive shocks are likely to endogenously 
increase the productive capacity of the economy, while persistent negative shocks will induce 
a downward shift in potential output. In related fashion, permanent trend shocks have an 
amplified impact through the endogenous movement of capital and labour across borders. 
 
Such trend volatility combines with cyclical fluctuations. Cyclical shocks can be driven by 
temporary production or demand shocks. In addition, the impact effect of current or 
anticipated trend shocks is also to induce cyclical fluctuations since the associated inter-sectoral or international resource reallocations do not occur instantaneously. Regardless of 
their source, cyclical shocks generate temporary shifts in wages, prices and employment 
levels that may depart from efficient levels due to a variety of nominal and real rigidities. 
 
Accordingly, it is extremely challenging to obtain a precise estimate of the relative 
contributions of cyclical and trend factors in determining macroeconomic outcomes in a 
given period. Still, the joint analysis of a variety of wage, price and activity indicators may 
provide a reasonable projection of the cylical condition of the economy.    
Moreover, in relation to policymaking, it is essential to incorporate the distribution of risks 
around such a central forecast.  In particular, a macro-prudential approach to setting fiscal 
policy would recognise the importance of providing insurance against downside risks. 
 
As indicated above, one particular type of risk relates to cyclical drivers that are prone to 
sudden stops.  Most obviously, activity levels that are driven by a combination of rising asset 
prices and a credit boom are typically characterised by a boom-bust cycle in which rising 
collateral values stimulate new credit-financed investment projects that deliver a sustained 
expansion phase until a trigger event leads to a revision in expectations and a sustained 
decline in investment that is amplified by a fall in collateral values and an increase in the cost 
of credit (see, amongst others, Geanakoplos 2009). During the expansion phase, the reversal 
risk may be low for a given planning period but is cumulatively large over a longer horizon. 
For this reason, the fiscal strategy should take into account macroeconomic risks over a 
range of horizons, not just vis-a-vis the next annual budget cycle. 
 
However, beyond the technical difficulties in correctly assessing the cyclical state of the economy and the distribution of fiscal risks, it is apparent that the discretionary components 
of fiscal policy have a procyclical bias in many countries (see, amongst others, Lane 2003 and 
Agnello and Cimadomo 2009). Accordingly, even if the government is fully aware of the 
current cyclical position, political economy factors may induce it to act in a pro-cyclical 
manner. 
 
There are two main types of explanation for fiscal procyclicality. First, the capacity to issue 
public debt may co-vary negatively with the state of the business cycle - under these 
conditions, a government may be compelled by conditions in the capital market to tighten 
fiscal policy during a recession. While the primary focus has been on the importance of this 
channel for developing countries, the current financial crisis has underlined that funding 
costs and funding risks may also increase during recessionary periods even for high-income 
countries.  In principle, this problem has a solution: a far-sighted government would run 
sufficiently-large surpluses during good times in order to avoid reliance on issuing debt 
during downturns. 
 
Second, political distortions may generate a procyclical pattern in the fiscal position. For 
instance, Tornell and Lane (1999) highlight the voracity effect mechanism.  In a political 
system with fragmented political power, a positive income shock leads to more intense 
lobbying by each powerful group.  Since any individual group does not internalise the impact 
of its spending/tax demands on the overall fiscal situation, the collective outcome is that 
spending patterns are procyclical -  an X percent increase in resources leads to a greater than 
X percent increase in spending. In contrast, a coordinated fiscal system does not exhibit such 
a procyclical pattern and spending is less volatile than income under this first-best benchmark. Lane (2003) presents some suggestive evidence that fragmented political systems 
generate more fiscal procyclicality. Talvi and Vegh (2005) and Alesina et al (2008) provide 
complementary explanations.   
 
According to these authors, voters require the government to cut taxes or raise spending on 
public goods during booms, in order to constrain the political temptation to divert boom-
year revenues towards transfers for politically-favoured elites or `rents' for politicians. In this 
way, the solution to the agency problem is for voters to call for a procyclical pattern in fiscal 
policy. While this is suboptimal in terms of the volatility of consumption, it is efficient in 
terms of limiting the waste of public resources on socially-useless political rents. 
 
A feature of these political economy models is that the procyclicality bias tends to be more 
severe, the greater is the level of macroeconomic volatility.  In a relatively-stable economy, 
the amplitude of the business cycle may be sufficiently low that it is sufficient to run a 
surplus in the low single digits during boom periods. However, in a more volatile economy, 
the higher amplitude of the cycle may call for substantially larger surpluses during expansion 
phases.  Macroeconomic volatility tends to be higher in smaller, more globalised economies 
due to the limited level of domestic diversification and the elasticity of international factor 
flows.  
 
Across the research contributions on fiscal procyclicality, a common refrain is that such 
political distortions can be mitigated by the existence of effective fiscal rules and fiscal 
institutions.  If fiscal policy is determined in an institutional environment that insulates the 
common interest from the adverse impact of sectoral lobbying or political rent seeking, such distortions can be neutralised and a fiscal policy with better cyclical properties can be 
attained.  We return to this topic in Section 4. 
 
Fiscal Policy, Sectoral Imbalances and Balance Sheet Risks 
 
It is apparent that the incidence of the global economic crisis has been most severe for those 
countries that experienced rapid credit growth and ran large current account deficits during 
the pre-crisis period (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2010). In particular, the reversal in capital 
flows has meant that demand has been compressed in the deficit countries, amplifying the 
impact of the global recession on living standards. While the increased dispersion in current 
account imbalances during the pre-crisis period may have been in part justified by a genuine 
improvement in the level of international financial integration, the vulnerability of deficit 
countries to sudden stops has re-ignited the debate about whether macroeconomic policy 
should lean against the wind in order to discourage the emergence of excessive external 
imbalances. 
 
In one direction, fiscal policy may itself be a source of external imbalances through several 
mechanisms.  The standard intertemporal model of the current account predicts that a 
temporary increase in government spending will result in a current account deficit, since 
households opt to smooth private consumption rather than to respond to the surge in 
government absorption via a decline in private absorption (Sachs 1982, Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1995).  A similar pattern also holds in the baseline new open economy macroeconomic 
model. In  this type of sticky-price general equilibrium model, a temporary increase in 
government consumption boosts domestic demand, generating a current account deficit and real appreciation (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, Corsetti and Muller 2006).   
 
In relation to the financing of public spending,  an increase in public debt may be associated 
with an increase in external debt if the conditions required for Ricardian Equivalence do not 
hold. This is demonstrated in the models developed by Ganelli (2005) and Kumhof and 
Laxton (2009), in which households have finite horizons, such that a debt-financed tax cut 
increases the wealth of currently-alive cohorts, boosting consumption and generating a 
current account deficit.  Furthermore, Corsetti and Muller (2006) show that the addition of 
an investment channel reinforces the pass through from a fiscal deficit to an external deficit 
in the case of persistent deficits, especially for more open economies. 
 
Kumhof and Laxton (2009) also show qualitatively-similar results apply in relation to a 
temporary increase in the fiscal deficit even in an infinite-horizon framework if some 
proportion of households are credit constrained.  Under these conditions, a debt-financed 
tax cut boosts the current consumption of credit-constrained or hand-to-mouth consumers, 
leading to a current account deficit. These authors also show that a permanent increase in 
public debt is associated with a permanent decline in the net foreign asset position in the 
finite-horizon model.  This prediction is supported by the empirical work of Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2002).   
 
 
In relation to other empirical evidence, Benetrix and Lane (2009a) show thatan increase in 
government spending is associated with an expansion in the relative size of the nontraded 
sector and a deterioration in the trade balance for a sample of EMU member countries. Related results for the trade balance are also reported by Lane and Perotti (1998), Corsetti 
and Muller (2006) and Beetsma et al (2008). Further evidence concerning the impact of fiscal 
policy on the current account is provided by Feyrer and Shambaugh (2009).  These authors 
identify fiscal shocks in the United States by reference to the narrative approach developed 
by Romer and Romer (2008). Their estimate is that 50 percent of an unexpected tax cut is 
passed through to an increase in the US current account deficit. 
 
In the other direction, fiscal policy can facilitate external adjustment, regardless of the 
original source of the external imbalance. This is especially relevant for countries operating 
under a currency peg or inside a monetary union, such that the nominal devaluation option 
is not available. The empirical evidence is that a contraction in public expenditure can 
generate a decline in the relative price of nontradables and a real depreciation at both short 
and long horizons (Lane and Perotti 2003, Ricci et al 2008, Beetsma et al 2008, Galstyan and 
Lane 2009, Benetrix and Lane 2010). 
 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the empirical evidence indicates a robust relation 
between government spending and the real exchange rate.  At medium- and long-term 
horizons,  the cointegration analysis of Ricci et al (2008) and Galstyan and Lane (2009a, 
2009b) shows that a sustained decline in government consumption (relative to trading 
partners) is associated with real depreciation.
1 A similar result is obtained in annual data by 
                                                        
1Galstyan and Lane (2009a, 2009b) also consider the long-run relation between public 
investment and the real exchange rate. Since a higher stock of public capital may affect 
productivity in the traded and nontraded sectors, its impact on the real exchange rate is 
ambiguous. In the data, there is little robust evidence of a strong link between public 
investment and the real exchange rate. 
 Lane and Perotti (2003). In related fashion, the VAR evidence for Europe provided by 
Benetrix and Lane (2009c) is that a relative decline in government spending is associated 
with a relative contraction in the size of the nontraded sector and an improvement in the 
trade balance. Similar results for the trade balance are also reported by Lane and Perotti 
(1998) and Beetsma et al (2008). In addition, in relation to the financing of the fiscal 
position, the evidence in the previous section was that, all else being equal, an improvement 
in the fiscal balance should be associated with a partial improvement in the external balance. 
Accordingly, a government may also facilitate external adjustment by improving the fiscal 
balance. 
 
In an environment in which a real devaluation is required in order to boost net exports but a 
nominal devaluation is not possible, a cut in the level of public-sector wages may be 
especially helpful in accelerating the required adjustment. A cut in public sector wages 
promotes wage adjustment in the private sector, both through the direct competition for 
workers across sectors but also through a demonstration effect. 
 
While there is considerable resistance to the notion of nominal wage reductions, some of the 
main frictions do not apply to coordinated wage reductions across the public sector. For 
instance, the negative morale effect identified by Bewley (1999) relates to the relative status 
of workers:  if there is a general wage reduction across the public sector, the relative 
positions of different groups of public-sector workers would be unchanged. Similarly, the 
holdup problem analysed by MacLeod and Malcomon (1993) and Holden (1999) refers to 
the localised bilateral bargaining problem between an employer and workers – wages may be 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 rigid in the face of sector-specific issues but flexible in response to macroeconomic factors. 
 
Moreover, such wage flexibility is more feasible under a social partnership infrastructure 
under which unions factor in macroeconomic conditions in wage negotiations. Such an 
encompassing deal would be less feasible in a non-coordinated setting in which the 
government must deal with individual public sector unions in a decentralised fashion. 
Finally, there is a stated fear in some quarters that nominal wage reductions may induce a 
deflationary spiral that will only serve to deepen the current recession. However, deflation is 
self-correcting for an individual member of a pegged exchange rate system or monetary 
union, since the cumulative real depreciation ultimately boosts economic activity levels and 
associated inflationary pressures. 
 
In Ireland, there has been a considerable reduction in public sector pay over the last two 
years, with the scale of the pay cuts increasing in the level of wages. While this adjustment 
may have been desirable, it necessitated the introduction of new legislation, since the existing 
wage contracts did not allow for such downward revisions.  It would have been better to re-
design pay contracts upon entry into EMU in 1999, in order to provide explicit recognition 
that negative macroeconomic conditions may occasionally require nominal pay reductions. 
 
In particular, a two-part pay scheme may be preferable.  Under such a system,  part A of a 
salary would be fully protected against downward adjustments  - this component would 
provide the employee with a level of income insurance for planning purposes. In contrast, 
part B of a salary would be a state-contingent payment.  Under an adverse shock, the part B 
payment could be reduced or eliminated in response to a set of defined trigger events, such as a contraction in GDP or tax revenues beyond given threshold levels. 
 
A trade off exists.  The larger the share of total compensation that is allocated to the part A 
component, the greater is the stability of nominal incomes but the lower is the degree of 
nominal flexibility. In exchange for greater stability, the average level of pay should be set at 
a lower level since the employer is in effect providing income insurance to employees and 
will need to build up a precautionary reserve fund to smooth out fluctuations. In contrast, 
average pay can be set at a higher level if the part B component represents a more significant 
fraction of total compensation, since total pay can be downwardly adjusted in the event of a 
negative shock. 
 
If such a state-contingent pay system were introduced for public sector workers, this would 
make fiscal policy a more effective instrument for macroeconomic stabilisation, in view of 
the key role for wage adjustment in minimising persistent unemployment. In relation to the 
private sector, similar multi-part payment contracts may spread in reaction to such an 
innovation in the public sector or as part of a new type of social partnership agreement. 
While the prevalence of bonuses and other types of discretionary payments in some private-
sector industries means that there is already some scope for downward pay flexibility, these 
are typically linked to firm- or industry-specific performance indicators rather than to 
macroeconomic factors.  From an economy-wide perspective, a state-contingent component 
in private sector pay deals that is linked to national macroeconomic conditions would 
facilitate macroeconomic adjustment. 
 
So far, this discussion has focused on the role of fiscal flows (spending, taxes, the deficit).  In addition, fiscal policy may be deployed to address balance sheet problems in the banking, 
corporate and household sectors with the net acquisition of financial assets by the 
government periodically deployed to bailout distressed private-sector entitities or to take 
these into public ownership. Such private-sector financial problems are more likely to occur 
if external or sectoral imbalances have accumulated.  For instance, rapid credit growth and 
significant external debt levels characterise those economies that have suffered the most 
severe financial distress during the current crisis.  More generally, prior lending booms are a 
significant predictor of subsequent banking and currency crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
 
Through such bailout operations, the public balance sheet may be transformed with the level 
of gross public debt or contingent liabilities jumping in a discrete fashion. In turn, such 
rescue packages may increase funding costs for the government and also constrain public 
spending and taxation decisions. 
 
While such interventions may be conditionally optimal given the circumstances (rescuing a 
banking sector from imminent collapse), a forward-looking fiscal strategy should incorporate 
the risk of such events in determining the optimal level of net public debt during normal 
times. In addition, it may be useful to accumulate a liquid rainy day fund to fund such 
interventions. Along these lines, Lane (1998a) advocated the establishment of a rainy-day 
fund upon Ireland's entry into EMU in order to provide some pre-funding in the event of a 
subsequent banking crisis.  
 
In the Irish case, no such rainy-day fund was established.  However, the National Pensions 
Reserve Fund (NPRF) was established in 2001 in order to accumulate assets with the goal of pre-funding the long-term increase in ageing-related public spending after 2025.
2  Although 
its mandate was to invest commercially on a global basis, a substantial proportion of its net 
value was recently re-directed towards the re-capitalisation of the two main Irish banks. In 
this way, the NPRF was re-deployed as a rainy-day fund, despite its stated long-term mission. 
 
While the existence of a rainy-day fund does carry moral hazard risks, it is also the case that 
the capacity of a government to fund a rescue package through new debt issuance may not 
be available when it is needed  --- the same types of shocks that generate private-sector 
financial distress may also be associated with tough funding conditions in the sovereign debt 
market. Recent proposals to tax bank profits in order to accumulate an insurance fund are 
similar in terms of objectives. 
 
We note also that rainy day funds can also support other counter-cyclical policies. As is 
discussed in Calmfors (2003), Finland set up a rainy day fund upon entry to EMU that 
accumulates extra social security contributions from employers during upswings in order to 
enable a lower contribution rate during downturns. This smoothing policy supports the 
stabilization of employment over the cycle.  
 
 
In relation to risk of banking-sector distress, the other lesson is that it is fiscally costly to 
permit the emergence of excessive external and sectoral imbalances that add to the fragility 
                                                        
2In addition to initial funding from the proceeds of the privatisation of the national telecoms 
operator, the government allocates one percent of GNP each year to the NPRF. 
 
 of private-sector balance sheets.  This provides a motivation to engage in preventive 
operations to limit the scale of such imbalances.   
 
Such interventions can be justified by a variety of distortions that limit the capacity of the 
private sector to self-correct excessive imbalances.  In general, individual decisions by 
debtors and creditors on the accumulation of debt liabilities cannot fully take into account 
the systemic risks that a function of the economy-wide aggregate balance sheet and the 
correlations in investment decisions across all types of entities. 
 
In relation to the external account, Summers (1988) and Blanchard (2007a) have argued that 
financial constraints mean that a contraction in tradables output during a period of high 
domestic expenditure may not be easily reversed once the economy needs to make the 
transition towards greater net exports. In addition, high net inflows may increase the risk of 
a sudden stop and the attendant risk of financial distress. For these reasons, economic policy 
should lean against the wind, in order to limit the scale of external imbalances. 
 
A wide range of preventive policies can contribute to a more stable and balanced pattern of 
economic growth. Most obviously, macro-prudential financial regulation can limit banking-
sector instability and excessive pro-cyclicality in lending practices (see also Geanakoplos 
2009).  However, this is an incomplete approach to the extent that non-bank financial firms, 
non-financial corporates and households can directly obtain credit from external funders. 
 
For countries with independent monetary policies, interest rate policy can in principle also 
contribute to the stabilisation of asset markets. However, it is open to question whether interest rate policy can be effectively deployed to this end and whether the cost would be too 
high in terms of deviating from the core objective of targeting inflation (Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach 2010). 
 
Accordingly, part of the responsibility for preventive stabilisation may fall to the fiscal 
authority. In relation to the real estate sector,  fiscal intervention may take the form of 
counter-cyclical taxes on property transactions as recommended by Fitzgerald (2001).  In 
relation to the external account, Blanchard (2007a) shows how the timing of government 
spending on nontradables and tradables may be optimally manipulated to limit the 
distortions induced by current account imbalances.  In addition, the government can target 
the current account balance via a number of instruments. First, a government that wishes to 
narrow a current account deficit could run a more positive fiscal balance.  Second, even at an 
unchanged fiscal balance, a reduction in government absorption can improve the external 
balance.   
 
Third, tilting the schedule for particular types of taxes can alter the timing of consumption 
and investment decisions and thereby improve the current external balance. For instance, a 
reduction in employment taxes contributes to real depreciation by lowering the cost of 
domestic labour (Calmfors 2003). A further type of microeconomic intervention is to alter 
the timing of consumption decisions through subsidies to saving schemes, which mimics the 
impact of a shift in the interest rate.
3   
                                                        
3While Ireland introduced the Special Savings Incentive Account (SSIA) scheme in 2001 to 
cool down the booming economy, the design of these scheme was not targeted at cyclical 
stabilisation. Most important, its fixed five-year horizon meant that the withdrawal of the 
subsidy in 2006/2007 was independent of the cyclical state of the economy.  In contrast, a  
The current crisis has underlined the high costs of a “do nothing” attitude towards the 
management of imbalances.  Accordingly, a major challenge for future research is to assist in 
the design of optimal intervention strategies for sectoral stabilisation. 
Of course, the implementation problems are quite substantial in terms of correctly 
identifying the emergence of excessive imbalances and working out the optimal timing and 
scale of policy interventions. In part, one type of reform is to modify and strengthen 
automatic stabilisers in order to deliver greater stability in a passive manner. However, 
automatic stabilisers will not be sufficient to deal with all types of shocks, such that the 
design and implementation of optimal discretionary fiscal interventions is also an important 
element of the policy toolkit. 
 
Reforming the Fiscal Framework 
 
 
The preceding analysis has highlighted that the conduct of fiscal policy has been revealed by 
the global crisis to have been far from optimal during the pre-crisis period.  In part, the 
quality of public finances was insufficiently robust to enable an unfettered fiscal response to 
the crisis at least in some countries due to the failure to run the required fiscal surpluses 
during the good years. In part, fiscal policy was passive in the face of the accumulation of 
sectoral and external imbalances in a number of countries.  The net result was that the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
cyclically-focused scheme would have specified a subsidy schedule that was conditioned on 
cyclical indicators. 
 




These problems suggest that the fiscal process requires reform. In particular, it is possible 
that a re-designed fiscal framework that combines fiscal rules and an independent fiscal 
council could deliver superior macroeconomic stabilisation. The formalisation of the fiscal 
process helps to mitigate the political distortions that can de-rail the setting of public 
spending and taxation; moreover, the conduct of fiscal policy in pursuit of macroeconomic 




There is some evidence that stronger fiscal rules are correlated with superior fiscal 
performance. European Commission (2009) estimates that those countries that adopt 
stronger fiscal rules are more successful in improving the structural fiscal balance. A similar 
result is also obtained by Fabrizio and Mody (2006) for a different panel of countries and a 
different index for the quality of budgetary institutions.  Related evidence is provided by 
Beetsma et al (2009), who show fiscal balances are more positive in countries with stronger 
fiscal rules. However, it is also important to appreciate the limitations to the empirical work 
in this area. In particular, Debrun and Kumar (2007) highlight the difficulties in obtaining 
identification, since the adoption of a rules-based system may be more likely in countries that 
would attain good fiscal outcomes even under a discretionary system. 
 Moreover, the analysis of the European Commission (2009) also emphasises common 
problems in the design of fiscal rules. Ex-post independent monitoring of compliance with 
fiscal rules is not widespread and there is little by way of sanctions in the event of non-
compliance.  In relation to central governments, many of the rules focus on expenditure 
growth, whereas the main cyclical problem in most economies is how to handle unexpected 
revenue windfalls. 
 
The current crisis has also illustrated the brittle nature of many of these rules, since the 
specification of the rules typically did not cater for the occurrence of major non-standard 
shocks.  An important lesson is that fiscal rules typically should include escape clauses that 
make clear the conditions under which the normal operation of a rule is suspended (see also 
Mody and Stehn 2009).  However, it is important that such deviations are only triggered in 
the event of genuine shocks, in view of the obvious potential for abuse. 
 
In terms of further evidence concerning the efficacy of fiscal rules, Chile provides an 
especially relevant case study (see, amongst others, Ffrench-Davis 2010). It adopted a new 
fiscal framework in 2001, which was subsequently codified in the 2006 Fiscal Responsibility 
Law. Under this framework, the Chilean government must run a structural fiscal surplus.  
Moreover, the state of the business cycle is evaluated by an expert committee such that the 
government must operate under this independently-determined constraint. During 2004-
2008, Chile ran a cumulative fiscal surplus of 28.5 percent of GDP, with the Treasury 
becoming a significant net creditor (fiscal liabilities were small, while the assets accumulated 
were substantial).  By building up a war chest during the boom years, Chile was able to meet 
the 2009 recession with a vigorous counter-cyclical policy: there was a 14.5 percent real growth in public spending in 2009, despite a 28.5 percent fall in fiscal revenue. (The 
projected 2009 overall fiscal balance was a 4 percent deficit.) 
 
The preceding discussion of fiscal rules has underlined that such rules are more effective if 
independent agencies play an active role in the fiscal policy process. More generally, the key 
to insulating the fiscal process from procyclicality pressures is to find institutional devices 
that enable governments to maintain the cyclically-appropriate fiscal stance. 
  
However, as has been highlighted by Wyplosz (2008), there are so far relatively few examples 
of effective Fiscal Policy Councils.
4 One interpretation is that the concept is relatively new 
and that such councils will become increasingly prevalent in the coming years, with the rate 
of adoption stimulated by the current fiscal crises in many countries.  Another is that there 
may be resistance among lobby groups to the establishment of a Fiscal Policy Council, since 
a shift towards a more long-sighted fiscal process would limit the access of such groups to 
debt-financed tax breaks or spending programmes.   
 
The current crisis presents a window of opportunity to make such institutional reforms, 
since it has revealed in dramatic fashion the costliness of the discretionary approach to fiscal 
policy that was practised in many countries during the pre-crisis years. 
The appropriate fiscal framework involves both fiscal rules and a central role for an 
independent fiscal council. In relation to the specification of fiscal rules, a priority is to set a 
target for the structural balance, even if the precise target may vary across countries with 
                                                        
4 See also the discussion in Calmfors (2008) and Calmfors (2010) in relation to the lessons 
from the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council. different initial conditions and different long-term fundamentals.  
 
However, the structural balance fiscal rule should contain an escape clause by which a 
structural fiscal deficit is permitted in the event of a sufficiently large negative shock.  Such 
an escape clause provides the flexibility to address major recessions, which may require extra 
fiscal measures beyond the automatic stabilisers that are part of the passive cyclical 
component of the budget. In terms of defining the conditions that would activate the escape 
clause, this could be delegated to an independent fiscal policy council in order to ensure that 
it is is only triggered by truly exceptional shocks (see discussion below). 
Moreover, a rules-based approach should enhance of counter-cyclical fiscal interventions.  
 
It should also be recognized that estimating the structural balance in real time is subject to 
considerable uncertainty, in view of the non-observability of the level of potential output. 
Accordingly, it is important to incorporate this uncertainty about the level of the structural 
balance into short-term decisions over fiscal policy, with the structural balance more 
appropriately considered a useful medium-term indicator of the fiscal stance. In the short-
term, fiscal uncertainty can manifest itself by revenue outcomes that deviate from projected 
levels.  A key principle of fiscal prudence is that windfall revenue gains are saved rather than 
mapped into un-planned increases in the level of public spending. 
 
An important consideration is that the short-term effectiveness of fiscal policy critically 
depends on long-term fiscal sustainability: if an increase in spending today signals a long-
term increase in the tax burden, its positive demand effects will be negated (Favero and 
Giavazzi 2006, Corsetti et al 2008). Accordingly, a credible rules-based framework that ensures that temporary fiscal injections will be subsequently unwound will enhance the 
effectiveness of  the fiscal boost by removing doubt about the long-term sustainability of the 
fiscal position. 
 
This main fiscal rule could be augmented by some ancillary rules. One candidate ancillary 
rule could relate to the establishment of a rainy-day fund that could finance a structural 
deficit under the exceptional circumstances outlined in the previous paragraph.  By holding a 
buffer stock of liquid assets, the financing of exceptional deficits by such a fund could avoid 
the need to seek fresh borrowing during those periods in which funding costs and funding 
risk are least favourable. The rainy-day fiscal rule could specify a target steady-state value for 
the fund (as a ratio to GNP).  Moreover, the rule could specify that surprise revenue 
windfalls should be paid into the fund and surprise revenue shortfalls paid out of the fund. 
In this way, the rainy day fund could play a leaning against the wind role in dealing with 
unanticipated revenue fluctuations.  Moreover, a rules-based approach to dealing with 
revenue surprises is strongly advocated by European Commission (2009). 
 
In relation to the appropriate role for an independent fiscal council, a partial list of tasks may 
include estimation of the cyclical state of the economy and the distribution of 
macroeconomic risk factors. In particular, an independent fiscal council may advise or issue 
a determination on an ex-ante basis concerning the appropriate cyclical fiscal balance. 
Alternatively, it may hold the government to account on an ex-post basis for the choices it 
has made concerning the cyclical operation of fiscal policy. 
 
In view of the difficult analytical challenges in determining the appropriate fiscal responses to the incipient emergence of sectoral or external imbalances, an important additional task 
may be to determine the conditions under which such imbalances require fiscal intervention. 
Moreover, an independent fiscal council could specify the types of fiscal interventions that 
may be required to correct excessive imbalances. In turn, this may require a considerable 
research effort to design the appropriate fiscal instruments and calibrate the required 
adjustments to public spending and taxation. 
In terms of setup, it is important that the fiscal policy council is an independent institution, 
for the same types of reasons that justify the independence of central banks.   
 
However, it is also vital that the fiscal policy council is accountable. Accountability can be 
made effective by a two-track process. First, the members of the fiscal policy council should 
testify before the relevant Parliamentary committee on a regular basis and explain clearly any 
errors in the projections and analyses made by the council. Second, the technical quality of 
the work produced by the fiscal council should be audited by regular reviews carried out by 
an international expert group. In this way, such a group would perform the same type of role 
as played by the Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund.   
 
Finally, it is desirable to match the Swedish practice by including some non-nationals in the 
membership of the council, since this expands the range of potential members and provides 




The goal of this paper has been to highlight how the global crisis should lead to a re-assessment of the optimal conduct of fiscal policy during normal non-crisis times.  First, the 
severe costs of the crisis signal that it is vital to run a prudent fiscal policy that not only 
operates in a counter-cyclical manner but also has a structural balance and level of fiscal debt 
that can permit a country to engage in aggressive fiscal interventions in the event of a severe 
negative shock. In addition, the cyclical conduct of fiscal policy must incorporate the 
distribution of macroeconomic risks, in addition to the central projection of the current 
cyclical state of the economy. 
 
Second, the stabilisation role for fiscal policy not only relates to the output cycle but should 
also respond to excessive sectoral and external imbalances, in view of the risks to 
macroeconomic and fiscal stability embedded in such imbalances. In tandem with macro-
prudential financial regulation, a wide range of fiscal interventions can help to tackle such 
imbalances, especially in environments in which monetary policy is rendered ineffective. 
 
Third,  pro-stabilisation fiscal policies are more likely to be successful if the fiscal policy is 
conducted within a formal fiscal framework that combines a set of fiscal rules with a 
substantive role for an independent fiscal policy council. While such ideas have been in 
circulation for quite some time, the current crisis provides an opportunity to consider them 
more seriously and broaden the scope of such fiscal frameworks, even in countries which 
have already partially implemented such fiscal reforms. 
 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the current crisis has also revealed the poor state 
of our knowledge about the empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of fiscal 
interventions. In addition to research on the normative issues that have been the main focus of this paper, it is a high priority to improve our empirical understanding of how fiscal policy 
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